While the Muni hacker evidently kept good security practices by switching bitcoin wallets frequently, that same vigilance failed to extend to his own basic inbox security.
Preliminary information suggests that the hacker used internet addresses based in Iran and jotted down some notes which were translated into Farsi. Apparently, the Muni hack was a bit out of character. According to the KrebsonSecurity source, most of the extortion targeted U. In July and August of , these attackers exfiltrated the background investigation data from OPM's systems.
They weren't done, though: by October , the attackers had moved through the OPM environment to breach a Department of Interior server where personnel records were stored, and in December another 4.
Fingerprint data was exfiltrated in late March of ; finally, on April 15, , security personnel noticed unusual activity within the OPM's networks, which quickly led them to realize that attackers still had a foothold in their systems. It's not entirely clear how X1 gained access to OPM's networks, but OPM had already been roundly criticized for poor security practices in the period leading up to the intrusion. It's also not entirely clear that X1 and X2 were the same person or group, but seeing as X1 stole information about OPM's network that would've been helpful to X2's agenda, the assumption is that they were at least working in tandem.
What is clear is that OPM's technical leadership, overly confident that they had defeated X1 with the "big bang," did not use the intrusion as a "wake up call" and failed to take measures that would have helped them detect X2. They had also largely failed to institute a number of important and recommended security measures , the most the important of which in the event was two-factor authentication.
Under a two-factor authentication scheme, users need a chip-enhanced ID card that correlates with their username and password in order to log into the system. Without it, an attacker who manages to steal a valid username and password—as X2 did, using a login pilfered from KeyPoint—has free access to the system. OPM finally implemented two-factor authentication in January , after X2 had already wormed their way into the network.
At any rate, once X2 had access to OPM systems, they used an Active Directory privilege escalation technique to obtain root access.
This was used to install a variant of the PlugX malware, a remote access tool that allowed the attackers to navigate around OPM's systems and compress and exfiltrate data, on several of OPM servers—including, crucially, the " jumpbox ," the administrative server that was used to log into other servers.
Sakula , another linked piece of remote control malware, was installed around the same time. As noted, X2's infiltration was finally detected on April 15, , when a security engineer was investigating encrypted SSL traffic on OPM's networks. The researcher determined a beacon-like ping was connecting a component on OPM's infrastructure called mcutil. At very casual first glance this may seem on the up-and-up; but mcutil.
In fact, mcutil. The scramble to diagnose the problem and defeat the attackers, which quickly involved the government's US-CERT emergency team, demonstrated some of the weaknesses in the OPM's processes that had helped make the incident possible in the first place. Confusingly, it involved two security software vendors with similar names: Cylance and CyTech. Back in , the security team had pushed for the agency to license Protect, a higher-end product from Cylance.
At any rate, the justification was chalked up to office politics in testimony before the Oversight Committee. Since this was a task more suited to Cylance Protect, they rolled out that tool in a free trial mode, and it " lit up like a Christmas tree. Cylance did not actually receive payment for months. Here are the states that have passed pay transparency legislation. In three states, employers must automatically provide salary information to you — again, exactly when that is varies by location.
So if a company has any kind of presence in the state, it is legally obligated to include salaries on its job listings. It also applies to national companies that are hiring remotely. Already, major employers like Amazon, Apple, IBM and others have begun adding salary figures to their remote job listings. Take this remote job listing for a copywriter role at the fintech company Chime for example.
Chime is based in San Francisco, but since the listing is national and the job is remote, the salary is there for all to see. Not all companies make their salary information readily available — some create separate versions of their remote job listings for Colorado residents and only include pay on that version of the listing.
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